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Formal Development and Verification of 
Safe Railway Control Systems 
Before 2021  all Danish signalling systems are going to be replaced with modern 
computer based systems. Central parts of these systems consist of safety-critical 
software. 
Challenges: How to develop such new systems efficiently (i.e. cheap and fast) and at the 
same time ensure that they are safe?   
 
Research Goals of RobustRailS WP 4.1  
Case Study: Safety Verification of  ERTMS/ETCS Level 2 Based Interlocking Systems  
                     Research Question
Method:
1. An interlocking system is specified by a track plan and a train route control table.
2. The train route control table can be automatically generated from the track plan. 
3. A tool automatically verifies  the specification for a number of correctness properties.
4. A tool automatically generates
    (a) a formal model  of all possible behaviours of  the interlocking system and
    (b) formal safety requirements (e.g no train collisions + no derailments). 
5. A model checker automatically proves  that the model satisfies the safety requirements.  
   The proof  is made combining  advanced mathematical techniques and SMT solving.    
   
 
Goals: to provide efficient methods and tools for the development and safety verification of such systems.
The main approach to achieve this is to make use of automation and formal (mathematically based) methods, 
as formal methods are strongly recommended by the CENELEC 50128 standard.
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A tool chain for verifying control algorithms and train route control tables:
 
   
 
Experiments:
    The method has successfully been applied to the early deployment line in East Denmark. 
   
 
Early deployment line East
 
   
 
Foto: Banedanmark
 
   
 
Illustration:  Banedanmark.
 
   
 
A model
 
   
 
  
